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ABSTRACT 
This is an event study that examines the effects of related party transaction (RPT) and corporate 
governance factors in a firm's daily cumulative abnormal return of the stock price (CAR), using 
a sample of 422 RPTs engaged by 286 listed f-irms in the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia from 
2008 to 2013. Univariate analysis (t-test) is used to determine the RPT's announcement effect on 
CAR in the short horizon window, and ordinary least squares (OLS) and logistic regression are 
employed to investigate the relationships between the W s  CAR and exogenous variables of 
RPT types and size, Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) activism, and corporate 
governance factors. The univariate result shows significant negative effects on CAR in the post- 
announcement of RPT, indicating governance discount of stock prices by the market in realizing 
the occurrence of expropriation, in particular asset acquisition and cash-payment types of RPT. 
The regression results show that cash ownership of the dominant owner and the divergence of 
control to cash right for the dominant owner and the directors have a significant negative 
relationship with CAR. This contributes to extant researches in emerging markets with findings 
that the problems of expropriation are mainly attributed to circumstances of high dominant 
family ownerships, which is further exacerbated by the entrenchment of the controlling 
shareholders and directors. This study also adds to the literature by showing evidence that 
MSWG activism, which results in higher fm's disclosure quality, has a significant positive 
effect on CAR in mitigating the expropriating behaviour of the controlling shareholders. 
Furthermore, the significant positive relationship between board independence and CAR also 
reinforces previous research findings that increasing the independence of the board enhances its 
effectiveness as an advocate for minority shareholders' interest. Finally, clear evidence was 
found that participation of the state's block holders or public investment fund contributes 
positively to the deterrence of expropriation by the dominant owner. 
Keywords: Related party transaction, MSWG, CAR 
ABSTRAK 
Kajian ini dijalankan untuk menyelidik kesan urusniaga pihak berkaitan (RPT) dan faktor urus 
tadbir korporat ke atas pulangan abnormal kwnulatif harian harga d a r n  (CAR) dengan 
menggunakan sarnpel sebanyak 422 RPT yang melibatkan 286 buah syarikat yang tersenarai di 
Pasaran Utama Bursa Malaysia dari tahun 2008 hingga tahun 2013. Analisis univariat telah 
digunakan untuk menentukan sama ada pengumuman RPT memberi kesan terhadap CAR dalam 
tempoh masa yang singkat. Kuasa dua terkecil biasa (OLS) dan regresi logistik digunakan dalam 
kajian ini untuk meneliti hubungan antara CAR syarikat dengan pemboleh ubah eksogen, iaitu 
jenis dan saiz RPT, aktivisme Badan Pengawas Pemegang Saham Minoriti (MSWG), dan faktor 
urus tadbir korporat. Dapatan univariat menunjukkan RPT menyebabkan terdapat kesan negatif 
yang signifikan terhadap CAR semasa pascapengurnuman RPT. Hal ini memperlihatkan bahawa 
terdapat diskaun urus tadbir ke atas harga saham dan kewujudan ekspropriasi. Hasil regresi pula 
memaparkan bahawa pernilikan tunai oleh pemegang saharn yang dominan dan pemisahan 
kawalan dari tunai oleh pemegang saham yang dominan dan para pengarah mempunyai 
hubungan negatif yang signifikan terhadap CAR. Hasil kajian ini menyokong penyelidikan sedia 
ada yang membuktikan bahawa masalah ekspropriasi yang disebabkan oleh pernilikan keluarga 
yang dominan serta tinggi. Keadaan ini diburukkan lagi dengan penguasaan daripada pemegang 
saham majoriti dan para pengarah. Kajian ini turut menarnbah kosa ilmu sedia ada dengan 
memperlihatkan bahawa aktivisme MSWG yang menghasilkan kualiti pendedahan firma yang 
lebih tinggi memberikan kesan positif yang signifikan terhadap CAR. Ini menunjukkan bahawa 
MSWG dapat mengurangkan masalah ekspropriasi dalarn kalangan pemegang saham majoriti. 
Di samping itu, hubungan positif yang signifikan antara CAR dengan kebebasan lembaga 
pengarah juga mengukubkan hasil penyelidikan sebelum ini berhubung kepentingan kebebasan 
lembaga dalam meningkatkan keberkesanannya untuk melindungi kepentingan pemegang saham 
minoriti. Akhir sekali, terdapat bukti yang jelas bahawa penyertaan pemegang saham blok atau 
dana pelaburan awam dapat mengurangkan masalah ekspropriasi oleh pernilik yang dominan 
secara positif. 
Kata kunci: Urusniaga pihak berkaitan, MSWG, CAR 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
What is minority interest protection quality, its significance and implication on a 
country's security market development? 
A developed securities market in a country is related to the establishment of a credible 
governance and enforcement rules designed to protect the interest of the minority investors, 
(Croci & Petmezas, 2010). From a macroeconomic perspective, poor corporate governance and 
legal enforcement will result in liquidity and turnover problems, which deprive h s  from 
financing valuable growth opportunities (Modigliani & Perotti, 1997). Besides obtaining less 
financing, the firm will invest less in intangible assets, whereby Claessens and Laeven (2003) 
found such pattern will eventually have an adverse influence on the economic expansion of a 
country. Furthermore, Lemrnon and Lins (2008) showed that a crisis or a negative shock in the 
weak market raises incentive of insiders or controlling shareholders to expropriate minority 
shareholders to compensate for their loss. 
According to the classic 'The Modern Corporation & Private Properfy' by Berle and 
Means (1932/1967), which is the foundational theory of corporate governance and institutional 
economics, dispersal shareholding ownership will result in management and directors managing 
the firm's assets and business to the owner's benefits with minimum oversight from investors: 
"The property owner who invests in a modern corporation so far surrenders 
his wealth to those in control of the corporation that he has exchanged the 
position of independent owner of one in which he may become merely 
recipient of the wages of capital.. [Such owners] has surrendered the right 
that the corporation should be operated in their sole interest ..." (p.355, 1932 edition) 
"the owners most emphatically will not be served by a profit seeking 
controlling group" (p. 1 14, 1967 edition) 
The implication was they advocate embedded privileges of investors to vote, and a better 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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